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will not merely, like the great Macedonian, cross the Indus, but the Yang-tse-Kiang as well, at the head of the entire European force, and so solve the international question also"—a suggestion made in 1879, but given fresh pertinence by recent events. "Whether," comments Willmann, grimly, "he will also have himself declared the son of Jupiter Ammon is not stated, but at all events he will have previously corrected the 'mistake in the world's history,' *i. e.*, the separation of church and state, by establishing a cultus which shall have as its object the organ of the world-spirit (the monarch)."

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Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics. Being a translation from Zeller's 'Philosophy of the Greeks.' By B. F. C. COSTELLOE, M.A., and J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A. In two volumes. London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co, 1897.—pp. xi, 520; viii, 512.

The translation of Zeller's volume on *Aristotle* (being Th. II, Abth. ii) now completes as far as the account of Neo-Platonism and the revival of scepticism the English version of his classic *Philosophie der Griechen.* The German is published in five volumes (of which this is vol. iv; vol. v is still untranslated), while the English occupies eight volumes and is somewhat curtailed, the English volumes being considerably smaller in form. The two volumes now published on Aristotle have, for some reason unknown to the writer, been delayed for seventeen years. They were announced to appear from the press of Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. in 1880. The translation is made from the third (1879, the latest) edition of the German. The translators tell us in their preface that Mr. Costelloe is responsible for the first seven and the last three chapters. Mr. Muirhead is responsible for the middle portion. Both translators, however, have revised the sheets, and there is no discernible difference in the excellence of the various portions of the version. They have condensed certain of the footnotes where they believed it could be done without injury to the work. They have provided only a meagre index (4 pages; the two volumes on the Pre-Socratics have an index of 25 pages), in the belief that the very full table of contents and Zeller's systematic method of handling his subject would enable readers generally to use the book with ease. In spite of these explanations, one is inclined to protest against the omission. Where a work covers so vast a field and embraces such a variety of details, every reader would be greatly helped by a carefully prepared pathfinder. The book will be used for the most part as a work of reference, in which an index is well-nigh a necessity, while for every book that is worth reading and keeping, some sort of index is a desideratum. As to the translation itself, it appears to have been done with great painstaking, skill, and accuracy. In various extended passages where I have compared it with the orignal, I have found it to be faithful without sacrificing the genius of English speech or introducing blemishes of German idiom.

It is an especial satisfaction to have the translation of this particular part of Zeller's work completed, because we have in English nothing to take its place. Students of Aristotle have, therefore, been looking forward with impatience to the issue of these volumes from the press. Grote's 'Aristotle' (posthumously published under the editorship of Alexander Bain and Croom Robertson) is only a torso, though very valuable for the 'Organon,' and Sir Alexander Grant's volume in the series of 'Ancient Classics' is of a rather popular nature, although immediately after its appearance it was honored by being translated into German, and was very cordially received by Aristotelian scholars on the Continent. We have good translations of some of the works of Aristotle, and in some cases admirable commentaries, but up to this time we have had in English no first-rate account of Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. We have been forced to be content with the more or less meagre statements in the handbooks of the history of philosophy. For this reason a systematic and complete statement of Aristotle's main theories in the various disciplines of knowledge merits a particular welcome in England and America. It is doubtful whether the remains of the Greek philosophical writers will ever again be subjected to the critical examination of a scholar uniting, in such high degree as Zeller does, the historical and interpretative genius. It is at least a very safe prophecy that his *Philosophy of the Greeks* will remain the authoritative work on its subject well into the next century. In its details, however, it will naturally need restatement from time to time in the light of advancing research and criticism. One of the characteristic features of Zeller's work is the admirable way in which he kept the various editions, as they issued from the German press, revised up to the standard of the very latest literature. His mastery of the immense special literature of his subject is striking; the most insignificant programs, dissertations, casual essays, and papers of societies, being subjected to a most thorough scrutiny. He unites in his writings two scientific tendencies, the one characteristic of the early part of the century, and the other of these last decades, viz., inquiry directed to ideal content, on the one hand, and to painstaking analysis of facts and evidence, on the other.

Zeller began his activity in philosophy as an Hegelian, and soon achieved an important position as a dogmatic and constructive philosopher. In this activity, however, he soon grew silent, and during this silence he produced his monumental volumes on Greek Philosophy and his historical and critical commentaries on the *Acts of the Apostles*. In these works, the dogmatist disappeared behind the sober objective critic, whose interest was centered in the examination of evidence and the unbiassed statement of historical truth. During his early years, he was in general sympathy with the Neo-Hegelians, Strauss and Feuerbach, in the philosophy of religion. But in 1862, in his inaugural lecture (*Ueber die Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnisstheorie*) at Heidelberg, he publicly proclaimed his return to the critical philosophy of Kant. Eighteen years before his Heidelberg lecture, the first volume of his *Philosophie der Griechen* was published, and the entire work was completed in 1852. Thereafter it appeared in constantly improved and enlarged editions. The English translation began to appear in about 1868 with the volume on *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*. The remaining seven volumes appeared at various intervals down to the completion of the work in 1897 by the part on *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*. Most of the translations were skilfully made by O. J. Reichel and Sarah F. Alleyne (*Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, 1868; *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, 1870; *Plato and the Older Academy*, 1876; *The Presocratic Philosophy*, 2 vols., 1881; *The Eclectics*, 1883). The third German edition (1879) of the *Aristotle*, from which the present translation is made, contains 175 pages more than the second edition, and is quite abreast of the literature of research up to the date of publication. This is everywhere evidenced by the criticisms in the foot-notes, which now and again mark Zeller's own change of views, while everywhere also there are signs of the careful correcting hand. In this edition Zeller defends the genuineness of Aristole's will against the objections of Grant (I, 37, n. 4). He finds that external and internal marks of genuineness sustain the tests of criticism. The will comes down from the Peripatetic Aristo, and the absence of any mention in it of a house in Athens or a library, the reference to the impossible age of Nicomachus, the evidence of forgery in naming a historical character like Antipater to carry out the directions of the will, and the un-Aristotelian provision of votive statues—objections brought by Grant—are fully answered and cleared away by Zeller. On the other hand, Grant's doubts about the authenticity of the *De interpretatione* are shared by Zeller, although the latter does not go the length of positively rejecting it. The most important points over which the interpreters of Aristotelianism in the last half century have been at variance, are viz. the doctrine of Substance, and the conceptions of the Prime Mover, and of the Creative Reason, the last having been a fruitful source of controversy from the very earliest Greek commentators down through the Arabs and Persians to our own time. As to the essential nature of the real (*οὐσία*), Zeller finds it impossible to reconcile the various statements of the *Metaphysics*, and considers the problem of interpreting Aristotle in this particular doctrine, so as to avoid contradiction, to be insoluble. Substance, or the ultimately real, is variously described as (1) form, (2) matter, (3) the composite (*σύνολον*) of the foregoing, *i. e.*, the individual thing. Zeller points out that the form or concept is always a universal, and that matter, therefore, must be the principle of individuation, which raises matter to a higher level than is usually conceded to it by the commentators. There is no room, Zeller says (I, p. 370), in Aristotle's system "for individual forms of sensible things." Now, although both form and matter are fundamental aspects of the ultimately real, they exist only logically, while the individual (*σύνολον*) exists essentially. Form and matter are ultimate principles of explanation in the individual, but only the individual has independent existence, and, therefore, objective reality. The difficulty here is this: While Aristotle adheres to the Socratic principle of regarding the concept (which is always universal) as the true essence of things, he insists that this universal has no existence apart from the individual. He thus makes the individual to be the substance or essential thing, and furnishes us with no means of explaining the contradiction (I, p. 377). Further, if science (as Aristotle insists) is concerned only with the universal, and if, on the other hand, only the individual is the ultimately real, it is difficult to see how science is to apprehend this ultimately real. Zeller leaves the difficulty untouched, and regards it as one of the inherent and insoluble contradictions in Aristotle's employment of his fundamental principles. He further rejects the theory of Hertling (*Materie und Form bei Arist.*, pp. 48, 56, 57), that the form in Aristotle is an individual thing, or that εἶδος is a "constitutive principle of individual being," this holding true rather of the material in which the form is first individualized. Professor Watson (PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, VII, 3, pp. 271, 272) does not think the individual is identical with 'object of sense' (as Zeller does, I, p. 372), but that it is "the individual which in all its changes maintains its permanent and indestructible 'nature' or 'form.'" This appears to imply the existence of an individual form, as Hertling holds. Otherwise this "permanent and indestructible 'nature'" is nothing but the generic and universal. On the other hand, Watson holds with Zeller that matter (PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, *loc. cit.*) is the principle of individuation.

A further point on which Zeller finds it impossible to bring the statements of Aristotle into consistency or intelligibility, is that of the Prime Mover. Although Zeller concedes the metaphysical importance of Aristotle's propositions concerning the Divine Spirit, and regards them as the "first attempt to find a scientific basis of Theism" (I, 399), he does not gloss over the difficulties in the doctrine either by omitting these difficulties from his interpretation, or by attempting any forced harmony. He has the courage to leave these discrepancies as they are, and to concede the inadequacy of constructive criticism to make Aristotle consistent with himself, or to fill in the permanent lacunæ in his system. He points out, with the severe conscientiousness of the critical historian, the unintelligible myth of the First Mover's operation on the cosmos by means of attraction, the impossibility of explaining the infinite variety of finite existence from simple and uniform activity, the illogical conception of the planetary divinities, and the unexplained relationship between particular forms and the Pure Form, or God, as the primary motive force of the world. He rejects unhesitatingly the harmonizing tendency of Brandis, who regards the particular forms as the eternal thoughts of God, a view that had peculiar attractions for the Middle Ages and was thoroughly exploited by Thomas Aquinas. While Zeller rejects all these explanations inspired by harmonistic tendencies, and maintains everywhere an uncompromising bearing towards the strictly historical nature of his subject, he does not underestimate the immense influence of Aristotle on the development of philosophic thought, or the intrinsic value of his system (I, 45, 46, 161 seq.; II, 336–347).

The third point on which, as I mentioned above, the interpreters of Aristotle have been much at variance, and in regard to which Zeller's sound objective criticism again comes to view, is that of the Creative Reason (*νοῦς ποιητικός*). All three of these doctrines, of *οὐσία*, *πρῶτον κινοῦν*, and *νοῦς ποιητικός*, are intimately connected with Aristotle's fundamental conception of form and matter, and his definitions of them are couched in terms of these two concepts, viz: *οὐσία* is the composite of form and matter, *πρῶτον κινοῦν* is the supreme and pure form, *νοῦς ποιητικός* and *νοῦς παθητικός* express the same dualism of form and matter applied to mental life. The creative reason has, according to Zeller, no consistent place in the Aristotelian psychology.

It cannot be the seat of personality, because it is the universal and eternal element in man and not the principle of individuation. It is not affected either by birth or death, or by the varying experiences of temporal existence. Zeller is an unyielding opponent of the 'Creationists' in the matter of the Active Reason. On this question (the Eternity of the Spirit), a bitter polemic was carried on between Zeller and Brentano shortly after the appearance of this 3d edition of the *Aristotle*. The polemic assumed a markedly personal character in Brentano's *Offener Brief an Eduard Zeller aus Anlass seiner Schrift über die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit des Geistes* (1883). This letter was called forth as a reply to Zeller's attack on Brentano, made in 1882 in the Prussian Academy of Sciences, and published in its Proceedings, vol. xlix. It is the most notable controversy awakened by the volume under consideration and was started by a difference of interpretation expressed in vol. ii, p. 122, note 4. In this note Zeller protests against the Creationism of Brentano, which was founded on misinterpretation of *De gen. an.* 736^a31 seqq. and *De an.* 408^b18, 430^a23. There is no space here to go into the merits or details of this controversy. Brentano's position is summed up in an off-print *Ueber den Creationismus des Aristoteles* (Proceedings of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Bd. Ci. Heft i, pp. 95 seqq. 1882) in which he attempts to show: (1) Aristotle in no passage teaches unambiguously the doctrine of the preëxistence of reason. (2) Aristotle expressly denies its preëxistence. (3) Aristotle teaches in positive terms the doctrine of creation. (4) Herein Aristotle is in agreement with his doctrine of other immaterial beings (viz, the planetary divinities). The explanation of Brentano is a revival of the interpretation of Thomas of Aquino, many of whose theories he attempts to rehabilitate. Zeller, whose view of the Creative Reason is akin to that of Averroës, gave his final word on the subject (to which I can here only refer) in the above mentioned volume of the Proceedings of the Prussian Academy, published three years after the appearance of the 3d edition of his *Aristotle*. In all of these cases, Zeller has maintained the same impersonal, judicial, objective attitude towards the history of his subject, and this attitude is characteristic of every page in the two volumes. It is this matter of sober temperament and method, combined as they are with prodigious historical learning and philosophical acumen, that gives us the key to the real value of the volumes before us, and it is to give expression to this that I have cited the doctrines above named. What Brentano and Teichmüller (*Die platonische Frage*, p. viii) complain of as a fault, viz, that Zeller does not reduce to consistency the (at least) apparent contradictions in Aristotle's and Plato's systems, by some subtle alchemy of philosophical interpretation, can only be regarded as one of the foremost merits of Zeller, and one which will make his works continue long as the leading authority in this extensive field.

WM. A. HAMMOND.

Christianity and Idealism. The Christian Ideal of Life in its Relations to the Greek and Jewish Ideals and to Modern Philosophy. By JOHN WATSON, LL.D. New Edition, with additions. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co. 1897. —pp. xxxviii, 292.

This book in its original form grew out of lectures delivered in 1896 by the author before the Philosophical Union of the University of California. The first edition had two main divisions, Part I being mainly historical, and dealing with the Greek, Jewish, and Christian ideals of life, while Part II undertook to show the relation of modern idealism to the view of life proclaimed by the founder of Christianity. In the new edition of the work, which is now before us, this division is retained; but, "while the first part has been left unchanged, the second part has been enlarged by the addition of three new chapters (the eighth, ninth, and tenth) and the intercalation of a dozen pages in the last chapter of the book" (p. vii). The new chapters are entitled respectively, The Failure of Materialism, The Idealistic Interpretation of Natural Evolution, and Idealism and Human Progress; while the additions to Chapter X (Idealism and Christianity) discuss the relation of the absolute to the human spirit, and indicate the essential identity of the position of Idealism on this point with that of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

Professor Watson's thesis in Chapter I—and this may perhaps be regarded as the main contention of the entire work—is that morality and religion are indissolubly connected. All the various reasons which may be given for the separation of morality and religion "rest ultimately on the assumption that it is not possible for man, with his limited faculties and knowledge, to get behind the veil of phenomena and grasp reality as it is in itself. . . . An attempt will be made, in the second part of this essay, to show that religion and morality can not be separated from each other without the destruction of both, and that the essential identity of the human and the divine natures, which is the essential idea of Christianity, is the legitimate result of philosophical reflection" (pp. 4–5). "The whole history of man goes to show